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Trial Practice and Procedure
by John O'Shea Sullivan*
Ashby L. Kent"
and Amanda Wilson**
The 2010 survey period yielded several noteworthy decisions relating
to federal trial practice and procedure in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, several of which involved issues of first
impression.' This Article analyzes several recent developments in the
Eleventh Circuit, including significant rulings in the areas of statutory
interpretation, removal, subject matter jurisdiction, and civil procedure.
I.

STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: JURISDICTION UNDER THE
CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS ACT OF 2005

A. Whether a Defendant May Submit Evidence to Establish the
Amount in Controversy When Removing a Case Under the First
Paragraphof 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)
In Pretka v. Kolter City Plaza II, Inc.,' the Eleventh Circuit reexamined the scope of its holding in Lowery v. Alabama Power Co.' and held

* Partner in the firm of Burr & Forman, LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. University of Georgia
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1. For analysis of Eleventh Circuit trial practice and procedure for the prior survey
period, see John O'Shea Sullivan & Ashby L. Kent, Trial Practiceand Procedure, 2009
Eleventh Circuit Survey, 61 MERCER L. REV. 1193 (2010).
2. 608 F.3d 744 (11th Cir. 2010).
3. 483 F.3d 1184 (11th Cir. 2007).
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that, because Lowery's "receipt from the plaintiff' rule does not apply in
cases removed under the first paragraph of 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b),4 a
removing defendant may present evidence to establish the amount in
controversy and "is not limited to that which it received from the
plaintiff or the court."' The dispute arose when the plaintiffs, a
putative class of prospective condominium purchasers, filed a class
action complaint in Florida state court against the developer, Kolter City
Plaza II, Inc. (Kolter), after Kolter refused to let the plaintiffs out of
their purchase contracts.6 The complaint did not specify the amount of
damages sought, although it did seek the return of "all sums deposited"
with Kolter by the plaintiffs.' Under the Class Action Fairness Act of
2005 (CAFA), Kolter removed the case to the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Florida.? Kolter's notice of removal
stated that the case satisfied the $5 million amount in controversy
requirement under CAFA because Kolter had collected purchase deposits
for the subject units totaling more than $5 million.o In support, Kolter
attached the sworn declaration (the Declaration) of its Chief Financial
Officer, who testified that Kolter had collected more than $5 million in
purchase deposits."
The plaintiffs moved to remand, arguing that Lowery prohibited the
district court's consideration of the Declaration because "it was not a
document received from the plaintiffs."1 2 Kolter opposed remand and
submitted an additional declaration from a Kolter officer, along with
relevant portions of the plaintiffs' purchase agreements to support the
amount in controversy.1
The district court granted the plaintiffs'
motion to remand, relying on Lowery and finding that: (1) it could not
consider the declarations and contracts submitted by Kolter because they
were not documents received by Kolter from the plaintiffs; (2) it could
not consider documents submitted by Kolter that were not submitted

4. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (2006).
5. Pretka, 608 F.3d at 767-68.
6. Id. at 747. The plaintiffs asserted claims against Kolter for violations of the Florida
Condominium Act and breach of contract, and sought to rescind their purchase and sale
contracts and to receive refunds of their deposits. Id. at 747-48.
7. See id. at 748 n.3.
8. Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
9. Pretka, 608 F.3d at 749.
10. Id. Kolter's notice of removal stated that the proposed class consisted of more than
100 members, that the parties were minimally diverse, and that the aggregate amount in
controversy exceeded $5 million, exclusive of interest and costs. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. (citing Lowery, 483 F.3d at 1213).
13. See id. at 750.
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with the notice of removal; and (3) Kolter could not "impermissibily]
speculatle]" on the "potential damage claim of putative class members,
as opposed to named plaintiffs.""'
The Eleventh Circuit granted Kolter permission to appeal, acknowledging that the appeal "brings us important issues of federal removal
jurisdiction and [CAFA], the decision of which requires that we take a
close look back at [Lowery]."" The court first noted that "CAFA does
not change the traditional rule that the party seeking [removal] ...
bears the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction."" The court
further reasoned that when the "plaintiff has not pled a specific amount
of damages, the removing defendant must prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional
requirement."" Using these fundamental principles, the court then
examined the "impermissible speculation" rule, which was based on the
court's statement in Lowery that "(tihe absence of factual allegations
pertinent to the existence of jurisdiction is dispositive and, in such
absence, the existence of jurisdiction should not be divined by looking to
the stars."s The Eleventh Circuit clarified the scope of this statement
as follows:
Lowery did not say, much less purport to hold, that the use of
deduction, inference, or other extrapolation of the amount in controversy is impermissible, as some district courts have thought. That was
not the question in Lowery. Instead, the question was how to apply the
preponderance of the evidence standard in the "fact-free context" of
that particular case. The answer we gave is that without facts or
specific allegations, the amount in controversy could be "divined [only]

14. Id. (quoting Pretka v. Kolter City Plaza II, Inc., No. 09-80706-CIV, 2009 WL
4547042, at *3-4 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 30, 2009)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
15. Id. at 747.
16. Id. at 752 (quoting Evans v. Walter Indus, Inc., 449 F.3d 1159, 1164 (11th Cir.
2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
17. Id. (quoting Williams v. Best Buy Co., 269 F.3d 1316, 1319 (11th Cir. 2001)).
18. Id. at 753 (quoting Lowery, 483 F.3d at 1215) (internal quotation marks omitted).
In Lowery, the removing defendant's notice of removal contained only a conclusory
allegation that the amount in controversy requirement had been satisfied. Id. at 752.
After the plaintiffs moved to remand, the defendant filed a supplement to its notice of
removal pointing to recent mass tort cases in Alabama with jury verdicts exceeding what
would be required, per plaintiff, to meet the $5 million requirement. Id. at 752-53. The
Eleventh Circuit held in Lowery that the record only consisted of"naked pleadings," lacking
specific factual details, discovery, affidavits or declarations, testimony, interrogatories, or
other evidence sufficient to establish the jurisdictional amount in controversy. 483 F.3d at
1209.
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by looking at the stars"-only through speculation-and that is impermissible."
Distinguishing Pretka from the "fact-free context" of Lowery, the court
noted that "[a] different question is presented ...

when a removing

defendant makes specific factual allegations establishingjurisdiction and
can support them (if challenged by the plaintiff or the court) with
evidence combined with reasonable deductions, reasonable inferences, or
other reasonable extrapolations." 0
The court then noted that "[t]he substantive jurisdictional requirements of removal do not limit the types of evidence that may be used to
satisfy the preponderance of the evidence standard," and that Lowery did
not hold to the contrary." Rather, the court reiterated that "[diefendants may introduce their own affidavits, declarations, or other
documentation[] provided of course that removal is procedurally
proper."22 The court also noted that other circuits that have addressed
the issue agreed "that defendants may submit a wide range of evidence
in order to satisfy the jurisdictional requirements of removal." 3 In
fact, the court found that "[nio court of appeals decision we could find
holds that a defendant may not submit its own evidence in order to
satisfy the jurisdictional requirements of removal, and we conclude that
the defendant can."24 Applying this reasoning to the case at bar, the
Eleventh Circuit held that Kolter had established the amount in
controversy by a preponderance of the evidence."
The court then turned to Lowery's "receipt from the plaintiff' rule.26
The district court in Pretkahad found that, under Lowery, it was barred

19. Pretka,608 F.3d at 754 (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Lowery,
483 F.3d at 1209, 1215).
20. Id. ("The point is that a removing defendant is not required to prove the amount
in controversy beyond all doubt or to banish all uncertainty about it.").
21. Id. at 755. Based on the body of Eleventh Circuit precedent holding that
defendants may submit evidence to satisfy the preponderance of the evidence standard, the
court noted that "there would be a serious prior panel precedent problem" if it read Lowery
as holding to the contrary. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. (citing cases from the United States Courts of Appeals for the First, Second,
Third, Fourth, Fifth, Six, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits, all of which held that
defendants may submit affidavits to establish the amount in controversy under CAFA).
24. Id. at 756.
25. Id. ("With regard to the substantive jurisdictional requirements, which allow
consideration of the .

.

. declarations and . . . [contracts submitted with the notice of

removal and/or in opposition to the plaintiffs' motion to remand], Kolter established by
more than a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy exceeds $5
million.").
26. Id.
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from considering Kolter's declarations and other documents "because
none of those documents was received from the plaintiffs."" On appeal,
Kolter contended that the district court erred and Lowery did not apply
because, among other reasons, Lowery and Pretka were removed under
different paragraphs of 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)." The Eleventh Circuit
noted that "[t]o settle this disagreement we have to examine in some
detail the procedural requirements of the removal statute and the
interpretation of them in our Lowery decision."2
The court then examined 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b), noting that the first
paragraph addresses cases that are removable at the time of commencement, whereas the second paragraph addresses cases that are not
removable until "'an amended pleading, motion, order or other paper'
establishes their removability."o The court found it to be significant
that Lowery involved removal under the second paragraph of § 1446(b),
whereas Pretka involved removal under the first paragraph." The
court noted that Lowery's "'receipt from the plaintiff' rule [was] based on
the second paragraph of § 1446(b), and that rule applies if 'the case
stated by the initial pleading is not removable,' but the case 'has become
removable' due to changed circumstances."" The court noted that in
"second paragraph" removals like Lowery, "the defendant's receipt of a
document indicating that the case 'has become removable' opens a new
30-day window for removal," and that "[tihe traditional rule is that only
a voluntary act by the plaintiff may convert a non-removable case into
a removable one."" Thus, the court found that the rule that "a
defendant cannot show that a previously non-removable case 'has
become removable' as a result of a document created by the defendant"
does not apply to cases like Pretka, which are removed under the first
paragraph of § 1446(b).'

27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 756-57; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b).
31. Pretka, 608 F.3d at 757. ("Kolter is not relying on the second paragraph of that
subsection to establish the timeliness of its removal but instead on the first [paragraph],
which applies because Kolter filed its notice of removal within thirty days of being served
with the summons and initial complaint.").
32. Id. at 760.
33. Id. at 760-61.
34. Id. at 761. The court noted that "our decision in Thomas v. Bank of America Corp.,
570 F.3d 1280 (11th Cir. 2009), did not extend Lowery's 'receipt from the plaintiff rule into
the context of first paragraph removals." Id. Rather, the court found that its decision in
Thomas "stands for the basic proposition that a fundamentally flawed declaration, in
combination with a complaint providing 'no information' on the amount in controversy,
cannot establish jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence." Id. at 761 n.19.
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The Eleventh Circuit held that "[tihere are two statements in ...
Lowery ...

with which we disagree and that are at least arguably

inconsistent with the result we reach in this case."' The first problematic statement from Lowery was that which implied that the "receipt
from the plaintiff" rule applies to first paragraph removal cases. 6 The
court in Pretka held that "[blecause Lowery was not a first paragraph
removal case, anything the opinion [in Lowery] sa[id] about the law
applicable to cases removed under the first paragraph . .. is dicta.""
The second statement with which the court disagreed was the
suggestion in Lowery that the "'receipt from the plaintiff' rule would
apply to any case in which the complaint seeks unliquidated damages."3 8 The court in Pretka held that this statement not only was dicta
(because it was unnecessary to the decision in Lowery), but also was
mistaken." The court in Lowery had relied on the Supreme Court of
the United States' holding in McNutt v. GeneralMotors Acceptance Corp.
of Indiana4 0 that "[wihere the law gives no rule [regarding damages],
the demand of the plaintiff must furnish one."' However, the court in
Pretka held that McNutt "does not support the Lowery opinion's
statement that jurisdictional facts may come from the plaintiff in cases
seeking unliquidated damages," but rather "that jurisdictional facts may
come from whichever party asserts federal jurisdiction."42 Noting that
no other appellate court had interpreted McNutt like the Lowery opinion

35. Id. at 762.
36. Id. The court in Pretka noted that the Lowery opinion misread Bosky v. Kroger
Tex., LP, 288 F.3d 208, 211 (5th Cir. 2002) and Huffman v. Saul Holdings, LP, 194 F.3d
at 1072, 1078 (10th Cir. 1999) as involving first paragraph removals when, in fact, those
cases involved second paragraph removals. Pretka, 608 F.3d at 762.
37. Pretka, 608 F.3d at 762. Although the dicta in Lowery may be inconsistent with the
court's decision in this case, the dicta is not controlling because "[wihatever their opinions
say, judicial decisions cannot make law beyond the facts of the cases in which those
decisions are announced." Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Watts v. BellSouth
Telecomms., Inc., 316 F.3d 1203, 1207 (11th Cir. 2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
38. Id. at 763-64.
39. Id. at 764.
40. 298 U.S. 178 (1936).
41. Pretka, 608 F.3d at 764 (second alteration in original) (quoting McNutt, 298 U.S.
at 182) (internal quotation marks omitted).
42. Id. The court in Pretka noted that the McNutt opinion "was written in the context
of a plaintiffs assertion of federal jurisdiction." Id. The Eleventh Circuit further noted
that "[olf course the plaintiff, who owns the complaint, must 'furnish'-properly allege-the
jurisdictional facts when bringing a case in federal court. But that tells us little, if
anything, about removal cases like [Pretka] in which the defendant is asserting that federal
jurisdiction exists." Id.
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did,43 the court reasoned that Lowery's interpretation of McNutt would
undermine the purpose of removal because "[a] diverse plaintiff could
defeat federal jurisdiction simply by drafting his pleadings in a way that
did not specify an approximate value of the claims and thereafter
provide the defendant with no details on the value of the claim.""
While the court noted that such "'artful pleading'. . . would not fool the
judicial audience forever," it would nonetheless "force a defendant to
tarry in state court when he has evidence establishing his right to be in
federal court, and to force state courts to waste their resources on cases
Summarizing the
that will eventually be decided in federal court."
distinctions between Pretka and Lowery, the court in Pretka held:
we are not persuaded by Lowery's dicta that its "receipt from the
plaintiff' rule should apply to § 1446(b) first paragraph removal cases,
or by its dicta that the rule should apply to any case in which the
complaint seeks unliquidated damages. Instead, we conclude in this
case, which arose under the first paragraph of § 1446(b), that the
evidence the defendant may use to establish jurisdictional facts46is not
limited to that which it received from the plaintiff or the court.
In applying these conclusions to the facts in Pretka, the Eleventh Circuit
held that the district court erred in not considering the evidence
presented by Kolter in support of its notice of removal, reversed the
judgment of the district court, and remanded the case with instructions
to rescind the order remanding the case to state court.4 7
B. Whether at Least One PlaintiffMust Meet the Amount in
Controversy Requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) to Maintain an
OriginalAction Under the Class Action FairnessAct of 2005
In Cappuccitti v. DirecTV Inc. (CappuccittiII),48 the Eleventh Circuit
held that the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA) 9 does not
require at least one plaintiff to meet the amount in controversy

43. Id. at 765. ("As far as we can tell, it has never been the jurisdictional rule that a
defendant may remove a diversity case seeking unliquidated damages only when the
plaintiff is the source of facts or evidence on the value of the case.").
44. Id. at 766.
45. Id. at 767. The Eleventh Circuit acknowledged that district courts in the Eleventh
circuit are split on the issue of whether a defendant has a duty to investigate the necessary
jurisdictional facts within the first thirty days of receiving an indeterminate complaint, but
declined to address that issue in Pretka. Id. at 767 n.23.
46. Id. at 767-68.
47. Id. at 774.
48. 623 F.3d 1118 (11th Cir. 2010) (Cappuccitti II).
49. Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
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requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)so in order to maintain an original
action in federal court." The court's opinion in Cappuccitti II is
interesting in that the court vacated its earlier opinion in the same case
that was rendered three months prior in Cappuccitti v. DirecTV Inc.
(Cappuccitti I).52
The dispute in CappuccittiI arose when Renato Cappuccitti and David
Ward (plaintiffs), on behalf of a putative class of DirecTV, Inc. (DirecTV)
subscribers in Georgia, filed suit in the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Georgia, seeking to recover certain fees that the
plaintiffs alleged DirecTV illegally charged for cancelling the plaintiffs'
subscriptions before they expired." The plaintiffs invoked subject
matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(dX2)," which incorporates
provisions of CAFA.ss Although the challenged fees ranged from $175
to $480 per customer, the plaintiffs sought damages for themselves and
the class of more than $5 million."
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), 57 DirecTV filed
a motion to compel arbitration and/or to dismiss the plaintiffs' damages
claims." The district court denied the motion to compel arbitration,"
but granted DirecTV's motion to dismiss.o DirecTV appealed the
denial of its motion to compel arbitration, but the Eleventh Circuit, in

50. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2006).
51. Cappuccitti II, 623 F.3d at 1120.
52. Cappuccitti v. DirecTV, Inc., 611 F.3d 1252 (11th Cir. 2010) (CappuccittiI), vacated,
623 F.3d 1118.
53. Id. at 1253.
54. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(dX2) (2006).
55. Cappuccitti1, 611 F.3d at 1253 n.1.
56. Id. at 1253. The plaintiffs' complaint claimed these damages under theories of
money had and received (Count I) and unjust enrichment (Count II). Id. The complaint
also contained claims for "declaratory and injunctive relief, on the theory that the early
cancellation fee constitutes an unenforceable penalty." Id.
57. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(bX6).
58. Cappuccitti 1, 611 F.3d at 1253. The subscriber agreements between the class
members and DirecTV contained "arbitration and class action waiver provisions." Id.
59. Id. In denying the motion to compel arbitration, the district court
reasoned that although the Federal Arbitration Act favors a policy of arbitration
by making arbitration clauses enforceable in federal court, the arbitration clause
and class action waiver in the subscription agreements were unconscionable (and
hence unenforceable) because Cappuccitti's total possible recovery was far lower
than the costs he would have to pay to prevail against DirecTV, and under
Cappuccitti's Counts I and II claims, if Cappuccitti were the prevailing party, he
could not recover attorney's fees.
Id. at 1253 n.3 (citations omitted).
60. Id. at 1253. DirecTV did not move to dismiss the plaintiffs' claims for declaratory
and injunctive relief. Id. at 1254 n.4.
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CappuccittiI, did not reach the merits of the appeal because it held that
the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction under CAFA to
entertain the plaintiffs' complaint from the outset."
The Eleventh Circuit in Cappuccitti I noted that Congress enacted
CAFA "with an eye toward curbing 'abuses of the class action device
.
The court held that, to remedy these abuses, Congress added
28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)6 3 to the diversity jurisdiction statute, which
provides federal courts with original jurisdiction "over class actions in
which the amount in controversy exceeds $5,000,000 and there is
minimal diversity (at least one plaintiff and one defendant are from
Although the Eleventh Circuit noted that it had
different states)."'
"extensively interpreted CAFA's jurisdictional requirements in the
removal context," it observed that its CAFA removal precedent did not
apply in Cappuccitti I because the plaintiffs had initiated the case in
federal court.66 Finding such original CAFA actions to be "relatively
rare," the court then considered the "jurisdictional requirements CAFA
imposes on a putative class action originally filed in federal court," and
summarized the four requirements as follows:
[28 U.S.C.] § 1332(d)(2) provides two of the requirements for original
CAFA jurisdiction: an amount in controversy over $5,000,000 (obtained
by aggregating the claims of the individual class members), and
minimal diversity. In addition, the preceding subsection adds a third
requirement ... the class action must have been filed under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23. Fourth and finally ... a plaintiff bringing
an action under CAFA must allege that there are 100 or more plaintiffs
within the proposed class(es).6 7

61. Id. at 1254. In "conclud[ing] that subject matter jurisdiction under CAFA was
absent from the moment Cappuccitti brought this case," the court of appeals vacated the
district court's order and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss the case in its
entirety. Id.
62. Id.; see also CAFA § 2(aX2), 119 Stat. at 4. Specifically, the court found that
"Congress perceived that state courts were overly friendly toward class certification,
provided insufficient notice to class members, and favored some plaintiffs over others in
making class awards." CappuccittiI, 611 F.3d at 1254; see also CAFA §2(aX2), 119 Stat.
at 4-5.
63. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (2006).
64. Cappuccitti 1, 611 F.3d at 1254 (quoting Evans v. Walter Indus., Inc., 449 F.3d
1159, 1163 (11th Cir. 2006)). The court held that the purpose of adding 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)
was "to situate more class actions in federal court ab initio and to make it easier for
defendants in a state court class action to remove the action to federal court." Id.
65. Id. at 1255.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1256 (citations omitted).
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The court then addressed, as a matter of first impression, the question
of whether at least one plaintiff must meet the $75,000 amount in
controversy requirement under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) to maintain an
original CAFA action in federal court." In CappuccittiI, the court held
that "in a CAFA action originally filed in federal court, at least one of
the plaintiffs must allege an amount in controversy that satisfies the
($75,000] requirement for diversity jurisdiction provided in 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(a)."69 The court reasoned that although § 1332(d) altered
§ 1332(a) to require only minimal diversity in CAFA actions, the court
found no evidence that Congress intended to eliminate the $75,000
amount in controversy requirement as to at least one plaintiff."o The
court found that "the $75,000 requirement expressly applies in actions
removed under CAFA, and we can think of no reason why Congress
would have intended the requirement in the context of CAFA removal
Applying this
jurisdiction but not CAFA original jurisdiction.""
reasoning to the facts in Cappuccitti I, the court found that CAFA
subject matter jurisdiction was lacking from the outset because the
plaintiffs "ha[ve] not alleged even one claim that, on an individual basis,
approaches the current $75,000 amount in controversy."72 Accordingly,
the Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court's order denying DirecTV's
motion to compel arbitration, and remanded the case with the instruction that the district court dismiss the entire case for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction.
Approximately three months later, the Eleventh Circuit vacated its
opinion in CappuccittiI, stating that "[slubsequent reflection has led us
to conclude that our interpretation [of the jurisdictional requirements of
CAFA in Cappuccitti I] was incorrect."" Contrary to its prior holding,
the court held in Cappuccitti II that "CAFA's text does not require at
least one plaintiff in a class action to meet the amount in controversy
requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).""

68. Id. The court noted that "[n]o court of appeals case of which we are aware has
expressly held that at least one plaintiff must meet the § 1332(a) amount in controversy
requirement to maintain an original CAFA action, and Lowery expressly reserved the
question." Id.
69. Id. The court noted that "[sluch a conclusion is compelled by the language of § 1332
as well as the general principle that federal courts are tribunals of limited jurisdiction
whose power to hear cases must be authorized by the Constitution and by Congress." Id.
70. Id. at 1257.
71. Id. (citation omitted).
72. Id. at 1258.
73. Id.
74. Cappuccitti II, 623 F.3d at 1120.
75. Id.
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The court cited 28 U.S.C. § 1332(dX6), which provides that "[iun any
class action, the claims of the individual class members shall be
aggregated to determine whether the matter in controversy exceeds the
sum or value of $5,000,000, exclusive of interest and costs."" The court
further held that "[tihere is no requirement in a class action brought
originally or on removal under CAFA that any individual plaintiff's
claim must exceed $75,000,"77 and observed that no Eleventh Circuit
precedent contradicts this holding."
Having clarified its interpretation of CAFA's jurisdictional requirements, the court held in Cappuccitti II that the plaintiffs had met the
jurisdictional requirements to bring an original CAFA action in federal
court." Holding that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction,
the court determined that (1) the plaintiffs brought the class action
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23; (2) the putative class
exceeded 100 persons;' (3) the amount in controversy, in the aggregate,
exceeded $5 million exclusive of interest and costs; and (4) minimal
diversity existed as the class was comprised entirely of Georgia residents
and DirecTV was a California corporation." Accordingly, the court
held that "[tihese factors alone were sufficient to allow the district court
to exercise subject matter jurisdiction" under CAFA.82
II.

SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION

A. Whether a Defendant Can Establish the Amount in Controversy
for Diversity Jurisdictionby Relying on the Nature of PlaintiffsAllegations, When Only Punitive Damages are Available and the Plaintiff
Does Not Specify the Amount of Damages Sought in the Complaint
In Roe v. Michelin North America, Inc.,' the Eleventh Circuit held
that the defendant met its burden of establishing the amount in

76. Id. at 1122 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 28
U.S.C. § 1332(d)(6).
77. CappuccittiII, 623 F.3d at 1122.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 1122-23.
80. Id. at 1122. Although the plaintiffs did not allege that the putative class was larger
than 100 persons, the court reasoned that "simple arithmetic dictates that it must be far
larger" because the damages claimed per individual ranged from $175 to $480 and the
aggregate damages claimed totaled $5 million. Id. at 1122 n.7.
81. Id. at 1122-23.
82. Id. at 1123. Because the Eleventh Circuit found that original subject matter
jurisdiction existed, the court then addressed the merits of DirecTV's appeal of the district
court's denial of its motion to compel arbitration. Id. at 1123-27.
83. 613 F.3d 1058 (11th Cir. 2010).
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controversy for diversity of citizenship jurisdiction by relying on the
nature of the plaintiff's allegations, even though only punitive damages
were available under the statute under which the plaintiff was seeking
relief, and the plaintiff did not specify the amount of damages sought in
the complaint." This action arose out of a car accident that occurred
when the tread on a Michelin tire separated and caused the vehicle to
roll over, killing the driver and passenger.' The plaintiff, Donald B.
Roe, as representative of the passenger's estate (Roe), sued the defendants Michelin North America, Inc. and Michelin Americas Research and
Development Corporation (Michelin) claiming that Michelin was
negligent in "designing, developing, and selling a tire that had a
tendency to fail under foreseeable driving conditions."" Roe sought to
recover damages from Michelin pursuant to Alabama's Wrongful Death
Act," which "allows plaintiffs to recover punitive, but not compensatory, damages."" Roe's complaint did not specify the amount of punitive
damages sought, but merely prayed "for damages allowed under
Alabama's Wrongful Death Act, in an amount to be determined by a

jury.",

Michelin removed the case to the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Alabama based on diversity of citizenship jurisdiction.90 In its notice of removal, Michelin alleged that, although Roe did
"not state a specific amount of damages sought," it was "facially
apparent from the complaint that the case met the $75,000 amount in
Roe moved to remand, claiming that
controversy requirement." 1
Michelin had "failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
more than $75,000 was at issue." Michelin argued that the nature of
Roe's allegations was sufficient to establish the jurisdictional amount in
controversy. The district court denied Roe's motion to remand,
concluding that Michelin had met its jurisdictional burden."
Roe appealed, arguing that, because the plaintiff had not "explicitly
stated the amount of damages [sought]," it was not for the district court

84. Id. at 1059.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1059-60.
87. ALA. CODE § 6-5-420 (2010), available at http-//alisondb.legislature.state.al.us/acas
/CodeOfAlabama/1975/6-5-410.htm.
88. Roe, 613 F.3d at 1060.
89. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
90. Id.
91. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
92. Id.
93. Id.
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to determine whether the claim likely exceeds $75,000.94 The Eleventh
Circuit disagreed with Roe, first looking to its removal precedent and
finding that in some cases, it may be "facially apparent" from the
complaint that the amount in controversy is met, even when "the
complaint does not claim a specific amount of damages."95 Thus, the
court found that in cases in which a defendant alleges that removability
is facially apparent from the complaint, the district court must
determine whether the jurisdictional burden is satisfied. 96 The court
further held that "the district court is not bound by the plaintiff's
representations regarding its claim, nor must it assume that the plaintiff
is in the best position to evaluate the amount of damages sought."'
Citing Eleventh Circuit precedent, the court held that, contrary to Roe's
assertions, district courts were permitted to make "reasonable deductions, reasonable inferences, or other reasonable extrapolations" from the
pleadings to determine whether removability is facially apparent from
the complaint."
The Eleventh Circuit next noted that this case was governed by the
first paragraph of 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)," because Michelin relied on

94. Id. at 1060-61.
95. Id. at 1061 (quoting Pretka v. Kolter City Plaza II, Inc., 608 F.3d 744, 754 (11th
Cir. 2010)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1061-62 (quoting Pretka v. Kolter City Plaza II, Inc., 608 F.3d 744,754 (11th
Cir. 2010)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The court explained that, "[plut simply, a
district court need not'suspend reality or shelve common sense in determining whether the
face of a complaint... establishes the jurisdictional amount.'" Id. at 1062 (quoting Pretka
v. Kolter City Plaza II, Inc., 608 F.3d 744, 770 (11th Cir. 2010)).
99. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (2006).
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Roe's initial complaint as the basis for removal.'oo The first paragraph
of § 1446(b) states:
The notice of removal of a civil action or proceeding shall be filed
within thirty days after the receipt by the defendant, through service
or otherwise, of a copy of the initial pleading setting forth the claim for
relief upon which such action or proceeding is based, or within thirty
days after the service of summons upon the defendant if such initial
pleading has then been filed in court and is not required to be served
on the defendant, whichever period is shorter.'0 o
Characterizing its precedent relating to removals under the first
paragraph of § 1446(b) as "relatively sparse," the Eleventh Circuit looked
to decisions from other circuits as persuasive authority.102 The court

100. Roe, 613 F.3d at 1061 n.3. The court found Roe's argument to be "grounded
primarily in misapplied dicta from Lowery v. Alabama Power Company, 483 F.3d at 1184
(11th Cir. 2007)" which did not apply to the facts in Roe because the Lowery case was
removed under the second paragraph of 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b). Id. at 1061 n.3. The court
noted that its opinion in Roe "considers removal only under the first paragraph of
§ 1446(b); it does not address the effect of Lowery ... on second-paragraph cases." Id. at
1061 n.4. The court stated that "[sipecifically, we do not decide whether or under what
circumstances the second paragraph [of § 1446(b)] permits a defendant to present
additional evidence to establish removability." Id. The court also noted that the second
paragraph of § 1446(b) permits two additional types of removal:
The first type of second-paragraph case (Type 1) is one that initially could have
been removed had the parties possessed the relevant jurisdictional information,
but, because the removability was not initially ascertainable, the defendant could
not carry its jurisdictional burden until a later time. The second type of secondparagraph case (Type 2) is one that originally could not have been removed
because it initially did not satisfy federal jurisdictional requirements, but that
later becomes removable because the nature of the dispute changes. Thus,
whereas Type 1 cases have always been removable but the removability was not
initially ascertainable, Type 2 cases shift from nonremovable to removable in
nature.
Id.
101. Id. at 1060 n.2; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b). On the other hand, the court noted
that
if removability is not apparent from the initial pleading, but it is later ascertainable that the case "is or has become removable," removal is governed by the
second paragraph of § 1446(b). That Paragraph states: "If the case stated by the
initial pleading is not removable, a notice of removal may be filed within thirty
days after receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of an
amended pleading, motion, order or other paper from which it may first be
ascertained that the case is one which is or has become removable. . .
Id. at 1060 n.2; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b).
102. Roe, 613 F.3d at 1062. The court was careful to look "only to those cases that have
evaluated the allegations in plaintiffs' complaints to determine the value of unspecified
amounts in controversy. In other words, [the court] look[s] only to other § 1446(b) first-
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first noted that in several instances, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit had considered "whether removability was 'facially
apparent' from an initial complaint, notwithstanding the omission of a
specific damage request.""o' The Eleventh Circuit cited the holding in
Luckett v. Delta Airlines, Inc." in which the Fifth Circuit held that
the "complaint's allegations of property damage, travel expenses, [an]
emergency ambulance trip, six days in the hospital, pain and suffering,
humiliation, and a temporary inability to do housework ... combined to
meet the jurisdictional requirement even though no amount of damages
was pled."' 5 The Eleventh Circuit also cited Gebbia v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc.,106 in which the Fifth Circuit held that a complaint without
a specified damage request fulfilled the amount in controversy requirement when "the plaintiff's allegations-that her slip and fall resulted in
severe physical injury, lost wages, lost enjoyment of life, and pain and
suffering-appeared to comprise a claim worth more than $75,000."107
Based on these holdings, the Eleventh Circuit noted that "the Fifth
Circuit has repeatedly acknowledged the power of district court judges
to appraise the worth of plaintiffs' claims based on the nature of the
allegations stated in their complaints."'s
The Eleventh Circuit also noted that the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit "has recognized the district courts'
authority to independently appraise the value of pleaded claims."1 0s
The court cited the holding in Angus v. Shiley, Inc."o where the Third
Circuit "explained that a district court does not measure the amount in
controversy by a plaintiff's statement of his minimal damage expectations, but rather by 'a reasonable reading of the value of the rights being
litigated."'"" The Third Circuit in Angus concluded that "given that
the complaint did not limit its request for damages to a precise monetary
amount, the district court properly made an independent appraisal of the

paragraph cases in which the plaintiff does not make a specific damages demand." Id.
103. Id. The Eleventh Circuit noted that this particular issue "arises with some
frequency in the Fifth Circuit, because 'plaintiffs in Louisiana state courts, by law, may not
specify the numerical value of claimed damages.'" Id. (quoting Gebbia v. Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc., 23 F.3d 880, 882 (5th Cir. 2000)).
104. 171 F.3d 295 (5th Cir. 1999).
105. Roe, 613 F.3d at 1063 (quoting Felton v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 324 F.3d 771, 774
(5th Cir. 2003) (summarizing the holding in Luckett)).
106. 233 F.3d 880 (5th Cir. 2000).
107. Roe, 613 F.3d at 1063 (citing Gebbia, 233 F.3d at 883).
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. 989 F.2d 142 (3d Cir. 1993).
111. Roe, 613 F.3d at 1063 (quoting Angus, 989 F.2d at 146).
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Relying on the authority from the Fifth and
value of the claim."
Third Circuits, the Eleventh Circuit further stated that it had "found no
case in any other circuit that purports to prohibit a district court from
employing its judicial experience or common sense in discerning whether
the allegations in a complaint facially establish the jurisdictionally
required amount in controversy.""
The Eleventh Circuit then turned to Roe's complaint and noted that
its "common-sense approach to deciding a jurisdictional challenge is
especially useful in cases brought under Alabama's Wrongful Death Act,
in which no compensatory damages may be recovered."u" Specifically,
the court noted that "[lestricting recovery to only punitive damages
eliminates many of the traditional means available to defendants to
obtain information about the value of claims."" The court found that
in these circumstances, plaintiffs could manipulate their complaints and
artfully plead their claims to wrongfully deprive defendants of their
right to remove and obtain a federal forum.n6 The Eleventh Circuit
stated, that "[Ihf courts were to rely solely on a plaintiffs damage
statements, as Roe suggests, it is difficult to imagine a punitive damages
suit that could be removed against a plaintiff's wishes."1
Based on these holdings, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district
court's conclusion that, more likely than not, the value of Roe's claims

112. Id. (quoting Angus, 989 F.2d at 146) (internal quotation marks omitted).
113. Id. The court explained that "the Fifth and Third Circuits' recognition of a district
courts' authority to determine the reasonable value of a claim comports with our precedent
and our holding in this case." Id.
114. Id. at 1063-64; see also ALA. CODE § 6-5-410 (2010), available at http://alisondb
.legislature.state.al.us/acas/CodeOfAlabama/1975/6-5-410.htm.
115. Roe, 613 F.3d at 1064.
116. Id.
For instance, a plaintiff could "defeat federal jurisdiction simply by drafting his
pleadings in a way that did not specify an approximate value of the claims and
thereafter provide the defendant with no details on the value of the claim."
Plaintiffs skilled in this form of artful pleading could, with this "trick," simply
'make federal jurisdiction disappear."
Id. (quoting Pretka v. Kolter City Plaza II, Inc., 608 F.3d 744, 766 (11th Cir. 2010)).
117. Id.
Thus, when a district court can determine, relying on its judicial experience and
common sense, that a claim satisfies the amount-in-controversy requirements, it
need not give credence to a plaintiffs representation that the value of the claim
is indeterminate. Otherwise, a defendant could wrongly be denied the removal to
which it is entitled.
Id.
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exceeded $75,000,18 and therefore held that the district court did not
err in denying Roe's motion to remand."
B. Whether Syndicates of Insurance Underwriters,As Unincorporated Associations, Have to Plead the Citizenship of Each of Their
UnderwritingMembers to Establish Diversity Jurisdiction
In Underwriters at Lloyds, London v. Osting-Schwinn,2 0 the Eleventh Circuit held, as a matter of first impression, that in order to
establish diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332,121
"syndicates of insurance underwriters who do business in the international insurance marketplace known as Lloyd's of London ('Lloyd's'),
must plead the citizenship of each of their underwriting members."122
The plaintiff, Carol Osting-Schwinn's minor son, was injured when his
motorcycle collided with a vehicle driven by an individual who was
insured by a policy underwritten at Lloyd's. The plaintiff filed an
insurance claim arising out of her son's injuries, which certain underwriting syndicates at Lloyd's offered to settle. The plaintiff's counsel
offered to release all claims in exchange for a payment in the full
amount of the policy limits and certain disclosures required by Florida
law. The syndicates accepted the plaintiff's settlement offer, paid the
plaintiff the maximum award under the policy limits, and produced
affidavits and a copy of the subject policy to satisfy the statutory
disclosure requirements. The plaintiff returned the settlement funds,
claiming that the syndicates had failed to meet the disclosure requirements. The plaintiff then filed a negligence action on behalf of her son
against Lloyd's insureds in Florida Circuit Court. 23
In response, the underwriting syndicates filed a diversity action in the
United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, seeking

118. Id. at 1064-65. In doing so, the court noted that it must examine the allegations
in light of the particular causes of action chosen by the plaintiff, combined with its own
"judicial experience and common sense." Id.
119. Id. at 1066. The Eleventh Circuit's opinion in Roe has been cited in the following
two opinions: Sua Ins. Co. v. Classic Home Builders, LLC, No. 10-0388-WS-C, 2010 WL
4664968, at *8 (S.D. Ala. Nov. 17, 2010) (declining to extend Roe outside of the context of
Alabama wrongful death cases) and Butler v. Charter Communications, Inc., No. 3: 10cv828WHA, 2010 WL 5116139, at *2 (M.D. Ala. Dec. 15, 2010) (declining to extend the holding
in Roe, and stating that "[t] his court agrees with another district court within this circuit,
however, that Roe, an Alabama wrongful death case, should not be extended to nonwrongful death cases merely on the basis that punitive damages are sought.").
120. 613 F.3d 1079 (11th Cir. 2010).
121. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2006).
122. Osting-Schwinn, 613 F.3d at 1081-82.
123. Id. at 1082.
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a declaratory judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201124 on the grounds
that the parties had reached a valid settlement of the plaintiff's
claim.' 25 The plaintiff moved to dismiss the declaratory judgment
action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, based on the syndicates'
failure to plead the citizenship of each of their underwriting mem-

bers.12 ' Relying on CertainInterested Underwritersat Lloyd's, London,
England v. Layne,127 the district court denied the plaintiff's motion to
dismiss, holding that the syndicates could establish diversity jurisdiction
based on the citizenship of the lead underwriter alone.1 2' Further,
"[tihe district court described Lloyd's as consisting of 'over 400 separate
syndicates and over 30,000 members,' and reasoned that disclosing the
citizenship of 'all underwriters at Lloyd's' would be 'unwieldy.'" 129 The
district court also noted that, given Lloyd's policy against disclosing the
identities of its members, "disclosure would prevent Lloyd's from
vindicating its rights in federal court."' Having denied the plaintiff's

124. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (2006).
125. Osting-Schwinn, 613 F.3d at 1082.
126. Id. at 1084.
127. 26 F.3d 39, 42-44 (6th Cir. 1994).
128. Osting-Schwinn, 613 F.3d at 1084 (quoting Underwriters at Lloyd's, London v.
Osting-Schwinn, No. 8:05-CV-1460-17TGW, 2006 WL 947815, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 12,
2006)). The district court found that the lead underwriter, as an agent for an undisclosed
principal, was the real party in interest to the controversy, and thus its citizenship alone
could establish diversity jurisdiction. Id.
129. Id. (quoting Underwriters at Lloyd's, London v. Osting-Schwinn, No. 8:05-CV-146017TGW, 2006 WL 947815 at *2 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 12, 2006)). The district court further
observed as follows:
Although Lloyd's of London is not an insurer but an organization that effectively
facilitates an insurance market, some courts and commentators occasionally have
used the term "Lloyd's" as shorthand for the underwriters, who frequently appear
in court either through their respective syndicates or through the lead underwriter
representing the syndicates' members. This shorthand contributes to the
confusion that already abounds in the area, since Lloyd's, which has its own
distinct identity and legal status as a British market facilitator, is generally not
a party to insurance proceedings such as the one in this case. That is, Lloyd's
does not seek in an action such as this one to "vindicate its rights" in federal
court. Rather, it is the underwriters who trade on the Lloyd's market, and who
appear in court in the form of syndicates, that seek to do so.
Id. at 1084 n.2.
130. Id. at 1084. Further, "the district court noted that 'federal and state courts have
allowed numerous cases to proceed in which Underwriters at Lloyd's, London was a party,'
and that the Florida legislature had 'acknowledged Lloyd's importance in commerce by
declaring them a person under the Florida Insurance Code § 624.04.'" Id. at 1085 (quoting
Underwriters at Lloyd's, London v. Osting-Schwinn, No. 8:05-CV-1460-17TGW, 2006 WL
947815 at *2 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 12, 2006)).
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motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the district
court granted the syndicates' motion for summary judgment. 3 1
The plaintiff appealed the district court's rulings on the motion to
dismiss and the motion for summary judgment, but the Eleventh Circuit
found the jurisdictional issue to be dispositive.132 In its analysis of the
citizenship issues on appeal, the Eleventh Circuit noted that "Lloyd's
itself d[id] not insure any risk," but rather "[i]ndividual underwriters,
known as 'Names' or 'members,' assume[d] the risk of the insurance
loss."1as The court explained:
Names can be people or corporations; they sign up for certain
percentages of various risks across several policies. Once admitted to
the Society of Lloyd's, each Name is subject to a number of bylaws and
regulations ensuring that he or she is solvent and "that at all times
there are available sufficient funds" to pay all claims."
The court further noted that "[ciritical to the diversity jurisdiction
question, Names are not only British citizens, but may be of many
nationalities."3 " The court described the relationship between Names
and syndicates as follows:
Names underwrite insurance through administrative entities called
syndicates, which cumulatively assume the risk of a particular poliThe syndicates are not incorporated, but are generally
cy....
organized by Managing Agents, which may or may not be corporations.
The Managing Agents determine the underwriting policy for the
syndicate and accept risks on its behalf, retaining a fiduciary duty
toward the underwriting Names. As mere administrative structures,
the syndicates themselves bear no risk on the policies that they
underwrite; the constituent Names assume individual percentages of
underwriting risk. The Names are not liable for the risks that the
other Names assume. Names purchase insurance through underwriting agents.
Lead underwriters, or active underwriters, serve as the public faces
for particular syndicates.... [The lead] underwriter is usually the
only Name disclosed on the policy . . .. [iun the event of a suit over a

131. Id. at 1085. In granting the syndicates' motion for summary judgment, the district
court held that the plaintiff and the syndicates had formed an enforceable settlement and
directed the underwriters to disperse funds to settle the claim and directed the plaintiff to
execute a general release of all claims. Id.
132. Id. at 1092-93.
133. Id. at 1083.
134. Id.
135. Id.
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Lloyd's policy, the lead underwriter is often named specifically in the
suit.1as
The court also noted that "each Name's liability is several and not
joint."13 ' This means that by contract, "the other Names that are
members of the underwriting syndicates on the policy remain liable for
their proportional share of any adverse judgments."" As a result, the
court found that "the legal relationship between the Names and the
insured is a vertical one: it is the individual Names, not the syndicate,
who are directly liable in the event of a loss, as if each Name had a
contract with the insured."139
The Eleventh Circuit then turned to the "'central issue' of whether the
Lloyd's syndicates in this case could properly invoke the district court's
diversity jurisdiction without pleading the citizenship of each of their
member Names."o The court first noted the "sharp distinction
between corporations and virtually every other form of association for
The court also
purposes of determining diversity of citizenship.""
acknowledged that "it has long been '[tihe tradition of the common law
... to treat as legal persons only incorporated groups and to assimilate
all others to partnerships,' which must plead the citizenship of each
member."'4 2
The Eleventh Circuit relied on the Supreme Court's opinion in Carden
v. Arkoma Associates, 4 ' a diversity suit against two Louisiana citizens
brought by an Arizona limited partnership.'" In Carden the defen-

136. Id. (citations omitted).
137. Id.
The Lloyd's Act of 1982 provides that an "underwriting member shall be a party
to a contract of insurance underwritten at Lloyd's only if it is underwritten with
several liability, each underwriting member for his own part and not one for
another, and if the liability of each underwriting member is accepted solely for his
own account."
Id.; see also Lloyd's Act, 1982, c. 14, § 8(1).
138. Osting-Schwinn, 613 F.3d at 1084.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 1086.
141. Id.
On the one hand, corporations are considered legal persons whose citizenship does
not depend on that of their shareholders .. . loin the other hand, unincorporated
associations do not themselves have any citizenship, but instead must prove the
citizenship of each of their members to meet the jurisdictional requirements of 28
U.S.C. § 1332.
Id. (citations omitted).
142. Id. (quoting Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co., 288 U.S. 476, 480 (1933)).
143. 494 U.S. 185 (1990).
144. Osting-Schwinn, 613 F.3d at 1086 (citing Carden, 494 U.S. at 186).
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dants claimed that complete diversity was lacking because one of the
plaintiff's limited partners was a Louisiana citizen."1s The plaintiff in
Carden responded that the citizenship of its limited partners was
irrelevant for diversity purposes. 4 ' Based on a "long line of cases," the
Supreme Court disagreed with the plaintiff, stating as follows:
[we] reject[ed] the contention that to determine, for diversity purposes,
the citizenship of an artificial entity [other than a corporation], the
court may consult the citizenship of less than all of the entity's
members. We adhere to our oft-repeated rule that diversity jurisdiction
in a suit by or against the entity depends on the citizenship of all of
members."'
The Eleventh Circuit determined that the Supreme Court in Carden had
provided "a general rule: every association of a common-law jurisdiction
other than a corporation is to be treated like a partnership.""' The
court further held that "the Carden rule clearly and neatly answers the
jurisdictional question we face.""' Specifically, the court found that
the Lloyd's syndicates "fle]ll squarely within the class of unincorporated
associations for which the pleading of every member's citizenship is
essential to establishing diversity jurisdiction."so Because the court

145. Id. (citing Carden, 494 U.S. at 186).
146. Id. (citing Carden, 494 U.S. at 191, 192). The plaintiff in Carden argued that the
citizenship of its limited partners was irrelevant under two separate theories: (1) "a limited
partnership, like a corporation, should be considered a citizen of the state that created it";
and (2) "federal courts should look only to the general partners rather than the limited
partners for diversity purposes, since the general partners have exclusive managerial
control over partnership operations." Id. (citing Carden,494 U.S. at 191, 192).
147. Id. (second and third alterations in original) (quoting Carden, 494 U.S. at 195).
The Supreme Court in Carden based its opinion upon "a long line of cases establishing the
principle upon which it relied." Id.
148. Id. at 1087 (quoting Indiana Gas Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 141 F.3d 314,317 (7th Cir.
1998). The court further noted that the Carden rule "applies without regard to the
corporation-like features or other business realities of the artificial entity." Id. at 1087-88.
149. Id. at 1088. The court also noted that "whatever the strength of its substantive
rationale, the Cardenrule avoids the potentially serious 'difficulty of creating and applying
a workable standard to determine which unincorporated associations possess sufficient
'entity' characteristics to be treated as corporations for diversity purposes.'" Id.
150. Id.
Syndicates in the Lloyd's market have no independent legal identities, but are
merely "creature [s] of administrative convenience": they operate as an aggregation
of individual members with individual contracts and obligations running to the
insured. They are organized by a Managing Agent and the lead underwriter, but
the Managing Agent is merely a fiduciary with no financial stake, and the lead
underwriter, despite typically having a greater financial stake and some
managerial responsibility, is ultimately just one among the syndicate's multiple
underwriters, all of whom are severally liable to the policy holder for their
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found that "the Lloyd's syndicates are classic examples of unincorporated
associations," the court further held that the rule established in Carden
"unambiguously requires that they plead the citizenship of each of their
member Names.""'
The Eleventh Circuit noted that the United States Courts of Appeals
for the Seventh and Second Circuits have also concluded that syndicates
of Lloyd's underwriters must plead the citizenship of each of their
members to establish diversity jurisdiction."' Although the court
noted that the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit had
reached the opposite conclusion in Certain Interested Underwriters at
Lloyd's, London, England v. Layne,' holding that "lead underwriters
suing in a representative capacity could establish diversity jurisdiction
based on their own citizenship,""' the Eleventh Circuit rejected the
Sixth Circuit's approach in Layne because it improperly relied on the
dissenting opinion in Carden, holding that "identifying the 'real party in
interest' [wals sufficient to determine citizenship.""5 s
The Eleventh Circuit addressed "one final possibility by which
jurisdiction might be salvaged" in the case at bar."' Specifically, the
court noted that "[sleveral circuits ha[d] held that because of the Names'
several liability, an individual Name that meets the amount in
controversy requirement may proceed in his individual capacity."'
Although the Eleventh Circuit was inclined to agree with this approach,
it held in the case at bar that it did not need to decide how to treat an
underwriter proceeding on his own behalf, because even if the lead
underwriter intended to sue in an individual capacity, it had not made
that intention clear in the complaint, and therefore, the underwriter had
not carried its burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction.'
Having determined that the district court "should not have continued
past the jurisdictional threshold," the Eleventh Circuit reversed, vacated

respective share of the risk.
Id. at 1088-89 (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Corfield v. Dallas Glen
Hills LP, 355 F.3d 853, 858 (5th Cir. 2003)).
151. Id. at 1089.
152. Id. (citing E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. v. Accident & Cas. Ins. Co., 160 F.3d 925, 931
(2d Cir. 1998); Indiana Gas Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 141 F.3d 314, 317 (7th Cir. 1998)).
153. 26 F.3d 39 (6th Cir. 1994).
154. Osting-Schwinn, 613 F.3d at 1090 (citing Layne, 26 F.3d at 43-44).
155. Id.
156. Id. at 1091.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 1092. The court noted that, in fact, the complaint seemed to suggest the
opposite-that the lead underwriter, Dornoch Ltd., was proceeding in a representative
capacity. Id.
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the summary judgment order in favor of the underwriters, and
remanded the case to allow the district court to "afford the Underwriters
a further opportunity to revise their complaint to establish complete
diversity of citizenship.""se
III.

CIVIL PROCEDURE

A. Whether a District Court Has Discretionto Deny a Plaintiffs
Motion to Amend Complaint Even Though Plaintiff Could Have
Amended Its Complaint as a Matter of Course
In Coventry First, LLC v. McCarty,'s the Eleventh Circuit held, as
an issue of first impression, that a district court has discretion to deny
a plaintiff's motion to amend complaint even though the plaintiff could
have amended its complaint as a matter of course under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 15(a) 1 without filing a motion to amend." ' The
dispute arose when plaintiff Coventry First, LLC, a licensed viatical
settlement provider in Florida,' 63 filed a complaint in the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Florida against
defendant Kevin McCarty, in his capacity as Commissioner of the
Florida Office of Insurance Regulation (Commissioner). The plaintiff
sought to enjoin the enforcement of the Commissioner's request,
pursuant to the Florida Viatical Settlement Act," that the plaintiff
produce extensive business records.' 5 The Commissioner filed a
motion to dismiss, but before the district court ruled, the plaintiff filed
a motion to amend its complaint to assert additional claims.16 The
district court subsequently granted the Commissioner's motion to

159. Id. at 1092-93.
160. 605 F.3d 865 (11th Cir. 2010).
161. FED. R. Civ. P. 15(a).
162. Coventry First,LLC, 605 F.3d at 867, 869-70.
163. Id. at 868. The Eleventh Circuit explained that "pursuant to the Florida Viatical
Settlement Act ... [viatical settlement providers purchase life insurance policies from
individual policyholders (known as 'viators') at a discount, continue to pay the premiums
to the life insurer, and then receive the face value of the policy when the viator dies."
Coventry First,LLC, 605 F.3d at 868; FLA. STAT. § 626.991 (2010), availableat http://www
.1eg.state.fl.us/Statutes.
164. FLA. STAT. § 626.991.
165. Coventry First, LLC, 605 F.3d at 868. The plaintiff also sought a declaratory
judgment that the records request both exceeded the Commissioner's statutory authority
under the Florida Viatical Settlement Act and violated the dormant Commerce Clause of
the United States Constitution. Id.
166. Id. In its motion to amend, the plaintiff sought to assert violations of the Due
Process and Full Faith and Credit clauses of the United States Constitution. Id.
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dismiss and denied the plaintiffs motion to amend the complaint as
futile. 6 7
The plaintiff appealed, arguing that the district court did not have the
discretion to deny the plaintiff's motion to amend the complaint.16 8 In
affirming the district court's denial of the motion to amend the
complaint, the Eleventh Circuit held that the "threshold question" of law
is whether, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a), "the District
Court had the discretion to deny the motion to amend as futile, given
that [Plaintifl] could have filed an amended complaint as a matter of
course.""' As the court noted, "Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)
gives a plaintiff the right to amend a complaint once as a matter of
course, so long as no responsive pleading has been filed."o The court
further noted that Rule 15(a) "[was] amended, effective December 1,
2009, to grant a party the right to amend as a matter of course within
21 days of a responsive pleading or motion to dismiss, whichever is
earlier."17 1
Although the Eleventh Circuit acknowledged that the plaintiff could
have amended its complaint as a matter of course under Rule 15(a)
because the plaintiff had not previously amended its complaint and the
defendant had not filed a responsive pleading, the court pointed out that
the plaintiff had filed a motion to amend, seeking the district court's
permission to amend the complaint.7 7 Noting that it had "not yet
addressed whether in such a situation a district court may deny the
motion to amend as futile [,]" the court decided that, because the plaintiff
filed a motion to amend, the plaintiff "waived the right to amend as a
matter of course and it invited the [d]istrict [clourt to review its
proposed amendments."'
Accordingly, the court held that the

167. Id. The Eleventh Circuit explained that, "[iln dismissing the complaint, the
[d] istrict court found that the Commissioner had statutory authority to request the [subject
business] records and that the McCarran-Ferguson Act . .. shielded the [Florida Viatical
Settlement] Act from dormant Commerce Clause violations." Id.; see also 15 U.S.C. § 10111015 (2006).
168. Coventry First, LLC, 605 F.3d at 868.
169. Id. at 869.
170. Id. The court also noted that "[flor Rule 15 purposes, a motion to dismiss is not
a responsive pleading." Id.
171. Id. at 869 n.1.
172. Id. at 869.
173. Id. at 869-70. The court distinguished this case from Williams v. Board of Regents
of University System of Georgia, 477 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2007). In Williams the court:
addressed a very similar, but significantly distinguishable, issue. There, the
plaintiff filed a motion to amend her complaint after the clerk of the district court
had erroneously refused to docket an amendment filed as a matter of course. The
court then ruled on that motion, rejecting as futile some of the plaintiffs amended
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plaintiff could not "complain that the [dlistrict [clourt accepted this
invitation [to rule on the motion to amend]," and "[flor this reason, the
[d]istrict [clourt had discretion under Rule 15(a) to rule on that
motion.""' Having answered the "threshold question" that the district
court had discretion to deny the plaintiff's motion to amend, the
Eleventh Circuit then affirmed the district court's finding that the
plaintiff's proposed amendments were futile, and affirmed the district
court's order denying the plaintiff's motion to amend in its entirety."'
IV.

CONCLUSION

The 2010 survey period yielded several noteworthy decisions, several
of which concerned issues of first impression in the Eleventh Circuit.
While this Article is not intended to be exhaustive, the Authors have
attempted to provide material that will be useful to practitioners by
providing them with relevant updates in the area of federal trial practice
and procedure in the Eleventh Circuit.

claims. [The Eleventh Circuit] held that, because the clerk of court had erred by
refusing to allow the amendment as a matter of course, the district court lacked
discretion to reject her claims as futile.
Coventry First,LLC, 605 F.3d at 869 (citation omitted) (citing Williams, 477 F.3d at 129192).
174. Id. at 870. The Eleventh Circuit noted that its conclusion was consistent with its
prior holding in Brown v. Johnson, 387 F.3d 1344 (11th Cir. 2004), in which the court held
that the district court abused its discretion by denying the pro se plaintiffs motion to
amend a complaint before any responsive pleading had been filed. Id. at 870 n.2. In
Brown the Eleventh Circuit held that the district court "abused its discretion by relying on
the erroneous legal conclusion that Rule 15(a) did not apply by reason of the Prison
Litigation Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)." Id. (citingBrown, 387 F.3d 1344). Unlike its
findings in Brown, the Eleventh Circuit held, in Coventry First,LLC, that the district court
properly applied Rule 15 and "properly exercised its discretion to consider the motion to
amend filed by counsel." Id.
175. Id. at 870 (noting that "[a] proposed amendment may be denied for futility 'when
the complaint as amended would still be properly dismissed'") (quoting Cockrell v. Sparks,
510 F.3d 1307, 1310 (11th Cir. 2007)).
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